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ABSTRACT
THE UK AND THE EMU: An Economic Examination of a Decision by the United
Kingdom to Join the European Monetary Union Based on Its Degree of Economic
Integration with Germany, France, and Italy
(Under the direction of Susan Wolcott)

Currently the United Kingdom is not participating in the European Monetary
Union. In 1992, it decided to “opt-out” of the first of three stages set out in the Maatricht
Treaty that some European countries began implementing in an attempt to move the
continent closer to monetary union. The people of the United Kingdom will have the
chance, in 2003, to decide the United Kingdom’s role in the EMU eleven years after it
first deferred its membership. If this upcoming decision were to be made on an economic
basis, the degree of integration between the United Kingdom’s economy with the EMU
countries’ economies would need to be determined because of the relationship economic
integration shares with the costs and benefits ofjoining a monetary union.
In this paper, I first develop and discuss a model of costs versus benefits of a
country that joins a monetary union. I then discuss the recent history ofthe road to
monetary union in Europe. Finally, I simulate the economy of the EMU zone by
examining three economic variables—inflation, unemployment, and real GDP growth
of three EMU countries—Germany, France, and Italy. After gathering this data, I
determine the degree of economic integration between these EMU countries and the
United Kingdom by running regression and correlation analysis on the data. To provide a
basis of comparison, I performed the same analyses with the United States’ data. By
performing the analyses with both the United Kingdom and the United States, my goal
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was to indicate the relative degree of economic integration of each to the EMU countries.
I used both the United Kingdom and the United States because I felt that it would
enhance the validity of my conclusion simply by having a comparison measure. In
addition to running the regression analysis using the individual countries’ data, I also
performed a regression analysis using the average of the three countries’ data for each
year’s variable to mitigate any problems of multi-collinearity that could appear in the first
round of regression analysis.
In the regression tests that used the averaged data, the results indicate that the
United Kingdom is more closely and thoroughly integrated with the economies of
Germany, France, aind Italy than is the United States. The correlation analysis further
enhanced the validity of these findings.
Therefore, I conclude that—according to the cost/benefit model I established—^the
United Kingdom is in a better position to benefit from joining the European Monetary
Union than is the United States because of its relatively high degree of economic
integration and correlation with the economies of Germany, France, and Italy, the chief
economies of the current EMU.
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Chapter I
Introduction

After the destruction brought upon Europe by the Second World War,there was a
growing sentiment for unification across the continent—a sentiment culminating in
Winston Churchill’s expression of the need for a “United States of Europe”(Ciminero 2).
But the actual attempts at creating a political union—such as the Council of Europe in
1949—failed because o f the unwillingness ofthe countries’ governments to relinquish
their political sovereignty. When attempts failed to create political union, birth was given
to the idea of economic union, which was thought to be a more tractable idea (Ciminero
2).
Although the roots of the European Monetary Union concept has been traced to
many different origins in many different time periods, two relatively recent events will be
the starting point of this paper:
1. the failed attempt to create political union in 1949
2. the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957.
These dates are important because they played a major role in helping shift the European
unity stance from a political to an economic perspective. Exactly 50 years, or one half
century, after the attempts to create political union throughout Europe failed, the
European Monetary Union was finally realized when, on January 1, 1999, the euro was
introduced as the single currency of Europe. Three years later, on January 1, 2002, the
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euro was implemented and began to circulate to take the place of the participating
countries’ denominational currency.
Before

the

countries

reached

this

landmark

date

of single

currency

implementation, each country planning on participating in the union had to commit itself
to various policies and standards that would set the stage for economic convergence
within in this “euro-zone.

In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty—the Treaty that outlined the

specific steps needed to achieve economic convergence in Europe—^was finalized and
was submitted to each potential member nation for ratification. Since Denmark was the
first country to have the opportunity to ratify the Treaty—and since the people of
Denmark chose not to accept the terms outlined in the document—doubt quickly
mounted as to whether or not monetary union would ever be achieved in Europe.
However, those doubts were quickly quelled as the Treaty enjoyed a relatively successful
post-Denmark ratification process. When the time came for the implementation of a
single currency in mid-1998, 14 countries were qualified to join the union but only 11 of
these countries did, indeed, join. The countries joining were Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Luxembourg,
and the three that did not join were Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
(Ciminero 12).
Because of the growing strength and/or popularity of this union, it might seem
odd to some that the United Kingdom has continued to “opt-out” ofjoining these likeminded nation-states in order to achieve a more geographically complete European
Monetary Union. It is not the idea of geographical “completeness,” however, that can
justify the United Kingdom’s decision to join this union.
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Instead, the extent of

integration and correlation between the United Kingdom’s economy and the economies
of the current member nations are two important factors to consider when making the
decision of joining the European Monetary Union. Two other key elements of the
decision are the projected monetary efficiency gains and economic stability losses that
the United Kingdom would face if it were to join the European Monetary Union.
While it is unlikely and infeasible to quantify all ofthe factors that will likely spur
the Brits to the voting booths this year to cast their opinion as to what the United
Kingdom’s role should be in this European Monetary Union, what can be quantified is
the extent of integration and correlation of the economy of the United Kingdom and other
EMU nations. Using the results of this analysis, a claim can be made as to whether or not
it is in the best interest of the United Kingdom to join the European Monetary Union.
In this paper, I will analyze the three economic indicators—Inflation,
Unemployment, and real GDP growth—of three nations currently participating in the
European Monetary Union—Germany, France, Italy—^to determine the extent of
integration between these countries’ economies with the economy of the United
Kingdom. Separately, I will perform the same tests with the economic indicators of the
United States replacing those of the United Kingdom to, again, reveal the extent of
integration between these countries’ economies and the economy ofthe United States.
To facilitate this analysis, I will run regression and correlation tests on this data.
The goal of this analysis is to determine which country—the United Kingdom or the
United States—is more economically integrated with the EMU countries of Germany,
France, and Italy. This level of integration is important because the higher the level of
integration of a country with the European Monetary Union countries, the higher the
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potential benefits the joining country would experience. Conversely, if the potential
joining country is not highly integrated with the European Monetary Union countries, the
costs it would experience by joining have the potential for being greater. If the test using
the United Kingdom’s data reveals a higher degree of economic integration than the test
using the United States data, the conclusion would follow that the United Kingdom is in a
good position to join the European Monetary Union. However, if the converse is true or
if neither test reveals a more favorable degree of integration than the other, the
conclusion would follow that the United Kingdom’s decision to join is of little
consequence because they are in a position to join the European Monetary Union that is
no better than that ofthe United States.
Further, in addition to the regression tests and correlation analysis of the United
Kingdom and the United States with respect to Germany, France, and Italy individually, a
situation of multi-collinearity may occur.

This situation often occurs when the

“explanatory” variables—Germany, France, and Italy—have a cumulative explanatory
value on the dependant variables—the United Kingdom or the United States—but the
math o f t he r egression c annot e valuate e ach e xplanatory v ariable’s e ffect i ndividually.
One indication that this situation has occurred in the test results is when the R square
measure is somewhat high but the P-value is high as well (a discussion of what this
means is found in Chapter four of this paper). If this situation occurs, I will perform
another regression analysis where the values of the economic indicators of the
explanatory variables are averaged and then used as one value in the regression analysis.
Before I state my conclusion, the limitations and shortcomings of this model are
discussed. All test results are summarized in table form and following the paper are

4

several graphs depicting the selected data used in this paper’s evaluation of whether or
not the United Kingdom should join the European Monetary Uriion.
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Chapter II
Benefits vs. Costs of Joining a Monetary Union

Introduction
The costs and benefits of a country entering a monetary union with other
countries a re d ependant u pon t hat c ountry’s d egree o fe conomic i ntegration—all o ther
things being equal—with the countries that make up the monetary union. For those
countries whose economies are not highly integrated with those of the monetary union
countries, all other things being equal, the costs of being monetarily unified with these
countries would outweigh the benefits this unification would provide—or would at least
not present enough benefit to cause the country facing the decision to “go to the trouble’
of joining the other countries in monetary union.

Conversely, the benefits of the

formation of a monetary union among countries whose economies are highly
integrated—all other things being equal—^would exceed the costs. In this latter case, it
would be economically wise for the country facing the decision of joining the other
countries in monetary union to do so'.
Costs
Participating countries in a monetary union—by their mere membership
surrender the ability to manipulate monetary policy and prevent exchange rate
fluctuation. The result is a country that cannot s tabilize its output, boost employment
The following discussion of the Costs vs. the Benefits a country must analyze when deciding whether or
not to join a monetary union is drawn from the text International Economics by Krugman and Obstfeld,
pages 600-628
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levels, or “spur” its economy through monetary policy (or have any of these happen
through exchange rate fluctuation). This “loss of control” is referred to as an economic
stability loss and, as stated earlier, is directly related to the degree of economic
integration a particular country has with the other countries in the monetary union.
The exchange rate of a country and the domestic output of the same country are
related in several ways. For example, when a demand shock decreases the demand for
goods or services in one country, a fluctuating exchange rate “softens the blow” in that
country by automatically changing the relative price of both domestic and foreign goods.
When the demand for this country’s output declines, its currency depreciates and
production falls reducing the transactions demand for money in this country. As a result,
the home country’s interest rate must fall to keep the money market in balance. It is this
fall in the “home” interest rate that causes the domestic currency to depreciate in the
foreign exchange market, which, in turn, causes the exchange rate to rise and domestic
goods to become “cheaper” in the market.

This effect partially offsets the initial

reduction of demand the shock brought to the country’s economy.
Another benefit of fluctuating exchange rates is the ability to manipulate interest
rates with monetary policy because of the direct relationship between interest rates and
exchange rates. With the right monetary policy, a country can help boost or stabilize or
reduce unemployment levels, output levels, and overall economic levels.
Because membership into a multi-country monetary union requires each country
to surrender its ability to manipulate monetary policy and establish a fixed exchange rate
system with other countries, it loses the option of stabilizing demand—an added
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instability for each country within the union. This added instability is referred to as an
“economic stability loss.”
This negative effect of participating in a fixed exchange rate system is dependant
upon the economic integration of the participating countries and the extent of a demand
shock experienced. If the shock affects the monetary union area as a whole, then because
each country in the union will have a fixed exchange rate system, each country will be in
similar positions in regards to their currency’s position worldwide. This effect mitigates
the consequences individual countries would feel. If, however, the shock was felt in only
one country within the monetary union, the effects would be worse for that country: the
country’s currency would be fixed and not be able to provide the cushion of depreciating
against other countries and no monetary authority would be available to manipulate the
interest rate to do likewise. Thus, the country would have to wait out the economic
slump and, in the process, face hard times.
These hard times, however, would be lessened if the country were economically
integrated with the other countries in the monetary union, meaning that the movement of
capital and labor across borders was somewhat painless. The fall in demand for the
country’s output subsequently leading to a fall in the country’s production would increase
unemployment levels, but those affected would be able to easily find work in other areas
or countries within the monetary union if the above case were true. In addition to labor,
capital could also be relocated within the union to be put to a more efficient use in the
above case and both of these conditions would reduce the initial effect of total
unemployment and increase the return on investment of these two factors of production
thereby virtually eliminating the downturn ofthe country’s economy. In addition to labor
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and capital, integrated trading among member countries of a monetary union would also
be helpful in mitigating the economic downturns of member countries within the
monetary union. When the demand for a country’s output declined, that country’s output
would decline causing the price for those goods to decline as well. When this happens,
this country’s goods would be perceived as more competitive than the other goods in the
union, thus leading to an eventually large increase in demand for this country’s output
relative to other country’s output.

This result would thereby eliminate the initial

reduction in demand for any single country’s goods.
Conclusion Concerning: Costs
As the degree of economic integration among member nations of a monetary
union increases, the economic stability loss that an individual cormtry experiences will
decrease as depicted by negative relationship as seen in line L in Figure 2.1 below
(Krugman 616).

Figure 2.1 - Cost of Monetary Union
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The costs associated with joining a monetary union can be summarized as follows:
1) Loss of ability to manipulate exchange rate to stabilize output and employment
2) Loss of ability to manipulate monetary policy to stabilize output and
employment.
If Economies are highly integrated and a high level of trade takes place then:
1) Decrease of price = more competitive goods = boost in employment
2) Unemployed laborers can travel abroad to find work and capital transfer allows
for most efficient use.
Benefits
While some assert there are drawbacks to a fixed exchange rate system between
countries, two of the most apparent benefits of a fixed system are 1) ease of calculation
and 2) a more predictable basis than floating exchange rate for country to country
transaction decisions. The combined gain from these two benefits is referred to as a
monetary efficiency gain and is present in a monetary union structure of fixed exchange
rates. This monetary efficiency gain is equal to the savings of a member country in a
monetary union from “avoiding uncertainty, confusion, and calculation and transaction
costs that arise when exchange rates float”(Krugman 612). Though most assert that the
actual calculation is somewhat difficult to quantify, it is generally held that for a country
to experience a high level of this efficiency gain, a high level of trade between it and
other countries is necessary. In other words, the monetary efficiency gain and the level
of trade are positively related.
Factors of production (labor and capital) also contribute to the monetary
efficiency gain in that with the free movement of labor and capital within an area of fixed
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exchange rates, the return on investment of capital or of labor will be more predictable
relative to the standard of living to which one is accustomed. Both labor and capital will
thus be drawn into their most efficient use. While these factors heavily contribute to the
monetary efficiency gain, they are dependant upon two things:
1. Price Stability
2. Confidence in a country’s commitment to a fixed exchange rate system by its
“economic actors.”
If either situation above does not appear, the monetary efficiency gain would most
probably still be present.

However, this “special situation” monetary efficiency gain

would be a much smaller gain than in the situation of price stability and high confidence
in the country’s commitment to a fixed exchange rate system.
As a side effect—or consequence—of a high level of economic integration among
member states of a monetary union, the inflation levels become transparent. Because of
this transparency, some countries would like to “peg” their exchange rates with that of a
lower inflation area to “import anti-inflationary resolve” of the area. Moreover, a high
degree of economic integration makes it easier to achieve low domestic inflation in
member countries because of the convergence of prices among integrated countries. This
propensity of low inflation levels also enhances the monetary gain that the member
countries experience within a monetary union.
Conclusion Concerning Benefits
As the degree of economic integration among member nations of a monetary
union increases, the monetary efficiency gain experienced by member countries (at the
point of entry into the system) increases—in the presence of price stability and firm
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commitment by an individual member country for participation in a system of fixed
exchange rates—as depicted in the positive relationship in line G in the Figure 2.2 below
(Krugman612,613).

Benefits of Monetary Union

Figure 2.2- Benefits of Monetary Union
The benefits associated with joining a monetary union if economies are highly integrated
are:
1. Simplification of economic calculations
2. More predictable basis for international transactions decisions
3. Monetary efficiency gain is magnified
Costs versus Benefits
When discussing the costs and benefits of a monetary union for member nations
or when presenting the costs and benefits in order for a country to decide whether or not
to join a monetary union, it is helpful to superimpose one of the previous diagrams onto
the other as in Figure 2.3 below (Krugman 616).
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Figure 2.3- Costs/Benefits of Monetary Union
On this chart, the economic stability loss is represented by L and the monetary
efficiency gain is represented by G and the intersection point, i, represents the minimum
point at which a country would decided to join the aforementioned monetary union of
fixed exchange rates. If economic integration of a deciding country and other members
of a monetary union is at any point to right of i, a country facing the decision to join into
this monetary union would find the economic benefits to outweigh the economic costs
and entering into this union would be advisable on an economic basis. Conversely, if the
economic integration of a country facing the decision of whether or not to join into
monetary union was at any point to the left of i, the economic costs of joining would
outweigh the economic benefits of joining. In this latter situation, it would not be
economically advisable for a country to join the monetary union.
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Chapter III
Recent History of the European Monetary Union

From Customs Union to the Be2innins ofMonetary Union
After t he failure o fthe attempt to unify Europe politically with the Coimcil of
Europe in 1949, the European Coal and Steel Community—^which was basically a coal
and steel customs union—was established by France, West Germany, Belgium,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Italy in 1951. Several years later, in 1957, these six
countries established the European Economic Community when they entered into the
Treaty of Rome, which was the first real step towards forming a monetary union between
the countries. It set a timetable for its members to remove all internal tariffs, establish a
common external tariff, and create a common agricultural policy among states. Another
goal of the agreement in The Treaty of Rome was the removal of all non-tariff boundaries
so as to achieve a “free m ovement o f p eople, s ervices, and c apital.” By doing so,the
nations attempted to “lay the foundations of an even closer union among the people of
Europe and preserve and strengthen the peace and liberty” of the member nations
(Ciminero 2). The “tractable idea” of monetary union in Europe had now begun down
what was destined to become the long path to realization.
The Hasue Summit
The Heads of Governments for these six member states convened at The Hague
on the first two days of December in 1969 where they agreed to “deepen and widen” the
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European Community by 1) establishing an Economic and Monetary Union and 2)
evaluating the United Kingdom’s admission into this group of nations. This Hague
Summit was spurred by the following reasons (Szasz 16):
1. Growing tensions within the international monetary system
2. Growing tensions within the European Economic Community
3. Germany’s East-West relations and its new Ostpolitik.
The Werner Plan and 'The Snake'
Soon after the Hague Summit the Council of the European Communities decided
to establish a committee “to prepare a report containing an analysis of the different
suggestions and making it possible to identify the basic issues for a realization by stages
of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community”(Szasz 30). The chairman of this
committee was the Prime Minister of Luxemburg Pierre Werner, whose name later
become synonymous with this committee’s recommendation

The Werner Plan”(Szasz

30).
The Werner Plan, published in October 1970, laid out a framework for the
realization of Economic and Monetary U nion. While placing a great emphasis on the
introductory and concluding stages of realization, the committee provided little guidance
for the implementation of the more formidable intermediate stages. Five months later the
Council of European Communities and the representatives of member states passed a
resolution accepting the recommendations of the Werner Plan (Szasz 30).
This resolution implemented the first stage of the monetary union by inviting
central banks from member states to participate in a controlled exchange rate scheme.
This scheme later became known as the “Snake in the Tunnel.” Essentially, the banks
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would keep exchange rate fluctuations of its currency within margins that were narrower
than those margins already in force against the U.S. dollar.

When graphically

represented, this smaller-within-a-larger-band-width looked like a snake slithering along
within a tunnel, hence its nickname (Szasz 36).
The snake was eventually implemented in April of 1972. It allowed the exchange
rates of participating countries to fluctuate between a positive and negative 2.25 percent
this coming after protest from the Dutch of the need for economic convergence among
countries before the narrowing of exchange rate fluctuation margins takes place (for a
more detailed discussion on easing into monetary union to understand this Dutch
opposition see “These hard times...

beginning on page 8 in the chapter two of this

paper). Less than one year later, in March 1973, the “tunnel” within which the snake was
to operate was eliminated when the Bretton Woods system—^which fixed the U.S. dollar
exchange rate against these countries’ currencies, was allowed to “float”(Szasz 39). By
no longer establishing a fixed U.S. Dollar exchange rate among countries, the tunnel no
longer existed. The outlook of the snake looked bleak.
Two of the reasons some advocated the necessity of floating exchange rates for
individual countries were that before the fall of the Bretton Woods system there was a
lack of monetary autonomy among countries and there was an asymmetry of currencies
worldwide. In fact, countries other than the United States did not have the ability to use
monetary policy to attain internal and external balance. By releasing the currencies fi*om
the fixed exchange rate system established by Bretton Woods, the countries’ central
banks regained their ability to manipulate monetary policy. For example, if a country
were facing an unemployment problem, it could allow its currency to depreciate, the
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relative price of that country’s goods would decrease, the world demand for these goods
would increase, and then the country would experience a boost in the employment
level—a remedy to unemployment that was legally forbidden under the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates.

Also, by allowing the exchange rates to float, the

asymmetry caused by the U.S. dollar being the central currency of the Bretton Woods
system—resulting with the U.S. Federal Reserve establishing the world money supply as
the other countries built up U.S. dollar international reserves—^was eliminated (Krugman
559-561).
However, there were also opponents to a floating exchange rate system. In fact,
at least five arguments exist against fixed exchange rates. The first two are discipline and
the illusion of greater autonomy. The possibility of central banks setting out on an
inflationary journey is real because of the lack of discipline by which the central banks
are forced to uphold a fixed exchange rate system. Opponents of the floating exchange
rate also s ee t he c laim o f greater monetary policy autonomy as irrelevant because the
exchange rate changes that would occur would most probably cause the central banks to
intervene h eavily i n foreign exchange m arkets e ven w ithout t he formal c ommitment a
“peg situation” establishes(Krugman 563, 564).
Other claims made by the opponents of a floating exchange rate are the
uncoordinated economic policies that would prevail worldwide between countries and the
injury to international trade and investment that would also result. The uncoordinated
policies could result from competitive currency practices among the nations that would
do more harm than good to the world economy. The injury to trade and investment
resulting from the floating exchange rates would be seen in unpredictable relative
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international prices. Lastly, destabilizing speculation and money market disturbance is
the remaining point in the opponents’ argument against a floating exchange rate system.
The claim is that speculation on exchange rate changes could open the door to instability
in foreign exchange markets and it could, in turn, have negative effects on the individual
countries’ internal and external balances. Not only would this instability cause harm in
the d omestic m arkets o f t hese c ountries, b ut t he d isturbances c ould a Iso b e felt i n t he
home markets to be more disruptive than those encountered under the fixed exchange rate
system (Krugman 563).
In February 1973, the Italians pulled out of the fixed margin system of exchange
rates advocated by the snake, and the French followed Italy out one year later in early
1974. Interestingly enough, in late June 1972, long before the Bretton Woods System
faltered, the British pulled out of the snake—perhaps, causing some of the other members
to give credence to the argument that a fixed exchange rate system should be a
consequence of economic convergence and not a predecessor of it. Some postulate that,
at the outset, the Council’s intention to establish a fluctuation margin was a veiled
attempt to set the stage for the introduction of a single European currency (Szasz 39).
Ultimately, had this fixed exchange rate scheme worked, the margins of fluctuation could
be continually reduced and member states’ economies would begin to harmonize. In
other words, their exchange rates would “coax” their economies into convergence, which
would be followed by the ultimate signal of convergence: a single currency(Szasz 44).
Another consequence of this resolution accepting the Werner Plan was the
establishment of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund that was “to be integrated at a
later stage into the Community organization of central banks” that would pool reserves of
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member’s central banks for “common management” (Szasz 46). The Bundesbank of
Germany thought that this Fund should be established only after economic convergence
of the countries, not before

an argument much like the previous Dutch concern of

narrowing exchange rate fluctuation before the occurrence of economic convergence.
Because the Bundesbank thought the idea of reversing the order of these two events was
absurd” and “unacceptable,” it became committed to making sure that the Fund’s tasks
would be simply administrative in nature and not monetary (for a more specific
discussion of easing into monetary union to understand this German opposition, see
These hard times...” beginning on page 7 in the previous chapter of this paper)(Szasz
50).
Eurosclerosis and the European Monetary System
In the second half of the 1970’s, stagnation in the drive toward European
integration had developed. The countries were approaching the ten-year anniversary of
the Werner Plan and no more progress had been made in the integration process than that
outlined in the beginning stages. The European Monetary Cooperation Fund was nothing
more than a book-keeping agency—partly due to the resolve ofthe Bundesbank to keep it
as such—and the snake was nothing more than a “mini-snake” without a tunnel (Szasz
51). Europe was said to have been suffering form “eurosclerosis”(Szasz 51).
To pierce this stagnation, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French
President Valery Giscard proposed a fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate system. It was
designed to “insulate intra-European trade from the effects of floating exchange rates and
to promote greater macroeconomic convergence” within the community(Szasz 64). The
acceptance of this 1978 proposal by member states led to the establishment of the
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European Monetary System in 1979. This exchange rate system was based on the
existing p arity o f t he s nake that a llowed a fluctuation o f+/- 2.25 p ercent. It was the
responsibility of each member nations’ central bank to maintain its currency within this
band, using its foreign currency reserves if needed. France, Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, and Italy—eight countries in a 11—joined
this European Monetary System on March 1, 1979, with little more than a rough timeline
for the achievement of monetary union vis-a-vis this new system (Ciminero 4). No
guidelines of convergence criteria among the nations, no agreement on “rules” of
managing this new monetary system, and no common strategy or tactics were shared
between the participating countries at the outset(Szasz 65).
The Surplus versus the Deficit View
The objective of this new system was the creation of a monetary stability zone in
Europe (Szasz 65). In order to achieve this goal, something had to be done to entice the
French to join, which could only be done by redesigning the system in order for it to 1)
work without inducing deflationary pressure on the French economy (see discussion of
inflation levels on page 10 in the previous chapter of this paper) and 2)keep France from
loosing face to the rest of the world (or at least to the other European countries). Thus,
France was allowed to propose a system that would address what they claimed would be
the deflationary effects of the system (Szasz 53). The potential problem centered on
movements of reserves across countries. The reserve flows occurred when countries
deviated from parity.
The intervention system in “The Snake” was based on a parity grid where each
participating currency had a central exchange rate against each other participant and an
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upper and lower boundary of fluctuation on this central limit was the obligatory
intervention point. To intervene on the currency’s behalf meant that the member nation
would have to obtain the necessary foreign exchange reserves from those countries whose
currency fell within the range, which left debts to be settled (Szasz 53).
Two views emerged from this mechanism: the surplus view and the deficit view
(Szasz 53). The surplus view regarded this process as a way to ensure that the member
countries were disciplined, and the deficit view regarded this process as a “one-sided” or
asymmetrical” policy that allowed strong countries to amass reserves without having to
adjust their surpluses while the weaker deficit countries had to enact deflationary policies
on their economies. The French mechanism for intervention was designed to address the
one-sidedness of the deficit countries by replacing parity grid of “The Snake” with
central exchange rates and intervention points expressed in a common unit of account, the
ECU. The ECU would not be traded nor would it have market value of its own, but the
currencies of all participating countries’ would be expressed in this ECU and then it
would be weighted on the economic significance of that country(Szasz 53).
France felt that Germany would be considered a “strong” coimtry whose currency
would appreciate against the ECU, causing it to buy US Dollars—^not other ECU
currencies

which would strengthen the competitive position of the weaker countries as

a whole. If, however, Germany did buy other ECU currencies, it would not be because
the c ountries n eeded s upporting, thereby e liminating any debt-repayment the countries
would, under the old system, be obligated to repay. Finally, the case made for the weaker
deficit countries asserted that the ECU would be more flexible that the snake because the
ECU itself would depreciate if the majority of participating currencies depreciated (Szasz
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54). To give the reader a reference to the then-current inflation of both Germany and
France during the 1970’s compared and then to the inflation levels in the countries
examined in this paper Figures 3.1 and 3.2 have been included below^.

Inflation in the 1970's of Germany and France
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Figure 3.1 -1970 Inflation in Germany and France

Figure 3.2-1970 Inflation Across Countries

^ These figures were created from the data used in the regression and correlation analysis of this paper. The
data for the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy can be found at Manfred Gartner’s
Macroeconomic Time Series website at www.fgn.unisg.ch/eumacrodata/dmtrxneu.htm and the data for the
United States can be found in the Economic Report of the President at www.w3.access.gpo.gov/eop
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The case from the weaker nation argument, or the deficit view, also outlined the
establishment of a “real” European Monetary Fund that would replace the then-current
“administrative duties” Fund by allowing it to perform central bank tasks and other tasks
such as determining policy conditions to be attached to credits granted from the Fund.
Essentially, t he d eficit v iew a rgued for t he E uropean M onetary Fund top erform t asks
similar to those of the International Monetary Fund (Szasz 54, 55).
The Basle-Nvbor2 Agreement and the Sinsle European Act

In 1986 clear evidence had accumulated, after years filled with actions by
different member countries that were inconsistent with the actions of an area trying to
achieve monetary union, that a commitment to exchange rate stabilization policies was
needed from the monetary authorities of individual member nations. This commitment
was n eeded i n o rder t o restore m arket c onfidence, which would help the area achieve
monetary union. Resulting from this early recognition by the member countries, an
agreement formally referred to as the Basle-Nyborg Agreement was signed in 1986
(Szasz 66).

It was heralded as “a comprehensive strategy” for member nations to

“achieve sufficient convergence towards internal stability” by establishing “rules of
conduct” (Szasz 73). Examples of these rules include extensions of the interval between
exchange rate intervention and settlements and also the doubling of the ceiling under
which renewal of financial operations was automatic (Szasz 73).

Following this

agreement a hiatus of exchange rate realignments among member nations, a problem that
had plagued European area since the early 1970’s, began giving credence to this strategy
agreement(Szasz 74).
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In addition to the Basle-Nyborg Agreement, the Single European Act was the
other event that revitalized and renewed the European spirit of achieving Economic and
Monetary Union in the 1985-era (Szasz 85). The Act proposed 282 “targets of growth,”
each with its own timetable for implementation, designed to eliminate many of the costs
and constraints facing European firms. By doing this, the goal ofthe Act was to increase
both the efficiency and competitiveness of European firms, which would—in turn—
create an economically stronger Europe (Ciminero 4).
Also included in the Act was a program aimed to complete Europe’s internal
market by December 31, 1992. It sought to amend vital elements of the 1957 Treaty of
Rome by removing three types of obstacles: physical barriers, technical barriers, and
fiscal b arriers. T he p hysical b arriers t o b e e ased i ncluded i ntra-European C ommunity
border stoppages, customs controls, and the associated paperwork of both. The technical
barrier goals included in the Act were aimed at easing divergent national product
standards, technical regulations, and conflicting business laws across the European
continent. Another technical barrier goal was the opening of nationally protected public
procurement markets. The fiscal barriers to be eased by the Act were the value-added tax
rates and excise duties between countries (Ciminero 4). With an emphasis on a more
intensive effort of liberalizing capital movements and freeing the European-area
economy, the Single European Act began leading Europe down the path that would
ultimately result in the Maastricht Treaty.

The passage of this Act coupled with

strengthening of Community decision-making contributed to a new, enlivened European
atmosphere in the mid- to late-1980’s(Szasz 95).
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The Delors Report
In June of 1989 at the European Council meeting in Madrid, the Heads of State of
member nations decided to examine the means by which they were to achieve Economic
and Monetary Union called for by the Single European Act. To do so, they examined the
Delors Report, which came from a committee established with “the task of studying and
proposing concrete stages leading towards this Union” to see if the reports contents
would facilitate achieving monetary union (Szasz 111). At the meeting the participants
also debated on which procedures and timetable to implement concerning the integration
(Szasz 111).
The Delors Report offered no distinction between or any achievable means by
which to achieve Monetary Union without achieving Economic Union as well. In other
words, Economic and Monetary Union would form two integral parts of a single whole.
The committee’s report called for the “transfer of decision-making power from Member
States to the Community as a whole... in the fields of monetary policy and
macroeconomic management,” and it asserted that “monetary union would require a
single monetary policy, thus placing the responsibility for developing this policy on one
decision-making body, not individual countries” (Szasz 116). While the committee
understood the importance of each country reserving its ability to make and implement
policies not directly concerning monetary union, it did recommend having member states
establish an “agreed macroeconomic framework” so that the Community as a whole
would have an “overall policy stance” and could prevent “unsustainable differences
between i ndividual m ember countries i n p ublic-sector b orrowing requirements”(Szasz
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116). Finally, the committee wanted to “place binding constraints on the size and the
financing of budget deficits (Szasz 116).
The D elors R eport a Iso called for t he i ndependence b etween c entral b anks and
national governments in order for the banks to commit themselves to achieving the
Community’s objectives of price stability and upholding its overall economic policy
(Szasz 116). Another reason for this independence was the need for the individual banks’
Governors to join the single currency area and the Executive Board of the European
central bank while, at the same time, not being biased or influenced by their respective
national governments when they participated in the decision-making that would set the
course for the European Central Bank and render it operational(Apel 119).
Economic and Monetaf'v Union: A Single Intesration
The committee made clear that integrating Europe economically and monetarily
should be a “single process’

■that once the member states committed to enter the first

stage they were to be ready to “embark upon the entire process” (Szasz 117). The report
also stated the need to eliminate competitive differences in countries and regions across
the European Community (Szasz 117). According to the Report union between countries
would occur in three stages. Although the committee scheduled the first stage to begin
on July 1, 1990, the second, which would begin when a new treaty was in force, and the
third stage, which would be the final stage marked by the integration of European
currencies into a single currency, were not placed on a specific timetable (Szasz 118).
It was not until after the European Council met in Rome at the end of October in
1990, that an agreement was reached specifying the substance of the third stage (Szasz
130). They were prompted to this decision because by the end of 1989, East and West
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Germany’s unification was a serious prospect. Both France and Germany believed this
should take place in the context of European integration. It was this agreement between
these two integral countries in the development of European economic integration that
spurred the beginning of the Intergovernmental Conference, which simultaneously started
the countdown to Maastricht(Szasz 144).
The Maastricht Treaty
The Maastricht Treaty was drafted in December, 1991, by the twelve countries in
the European Community to address the issue of Economic and Monetary Union in
Europe. Perhaps, the most significant aspect of this Treaty was that it established a
timeline for the achievement of monetary union by either January 1,1997 or, at the latest,
January 1, 1999. Outlined in the Treaty were five convergence criteria that a majority of
member nations must achieve to determine which of the above dates would mark the
official b eginning o f t he E uropean E conomic a nd M onetary Union. Included i n these
criteria were price stability—where inflation rates of all participating countries must be
within one and a half percentage points of the average of the lowest three countries’
inflation rates—and a stable currency that must not have been devalued in the previous
two years while remaining within the acceptable fluctuation band in the exchange rate
mechanism. Other stipulations of the five set out in the Treaty included a target budget
deficit that was not to exceed 3 percent of the respective country’s GDP and a limit on
public debt so as not to exceed 60 percent of the respective country’s GDP. Lastly,
inflation rates of each participating country were to have been between 2 percentage
points of the average ofthe three countries with the lowest inflation rates(Ciminero 6).
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The Stases ofthe Process
The first stage of the process of achieving monetary union required only a yea or
nay from interested countries. Thus, stage one began before the Maastricht Treaty was in
effect.

Stage Two ran into problems towards its completion when, in 1992, “Black

September” appeared b ringing w ith i t c urrency tensions that did not subside until one
year later in August 1993. During this year, five realignments of bilateral central rates
took place, two currencies withdrew from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and the
bandwidth of allowable fluctuation widened from +/- 2.25% to +/- 15%. Although this
tremendous increase in fluctuation allowance was a regressive instead of progressive step
toward achieving monetary union, it was necessary to keep more currencies from being
forced out of the Mechanism. Stage Three would begin with the adoption of a single
European currency for all participating states (Apel 106).
Interestingly, now that the European Monetary Union had been established
through the Maastricht Treaty, and economic and monetary integration among European
nations seemed more evident than ever before, problems still loomed on the horizon as to
whether or not union would be able to be achieved among all nations. Even in the wake
of this currency crisis beginning in 1992, though, the last element to be put in place—the
ratification of the Treaty by all participating countries—^was to begin taking place in that
same year(Apel 106).
Ratification and the 'German Problem'
In June, 1992, Denmark, through national referendum, did not ratify the Treaty.
Because Denmark was the first country to have the opportunity to ratify the Treaty, its
non-ratification quickly cast uncertainty on the ratification of the Treaty by the other
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nations and, ultimately, on the achievement of monetary union across Europe. The
French referendum was scheduled for three months after the Denmark renunciation ofthe
Treaty and exit polls indicated that the vote would be “too close to call”(Apel 109).
Another major problem that the ratification process was facing were the
inflationary tendencies of Gemiany resulting from the East and West reunification, which
was provoking the Bundesbank to maintain high interest rates. While high interest rates
help rein in inflation-ridden economies, economies in need of expansionary policies need
low interest rates.

Hence, those Member States with high levels of unemployment

needed to separate themselves from Bundesbank’s monetary policy benchmarks—
essentially forcing those States into currency realignment with the German Deutsche
mark (Apel 109). The result was erratic behavior by Member central banks whether by
official intervention or by defensive interest rate increases that did not bode well for
either economic convergence or Monetary Union hopes(Apel, 110, 111).
The Delay ofImplementation
The Maastricht Treaty specified a majority (eight) of the Member States to reach
the convergence criteria by the end of 1996 if the third stage was to begin on January 1,
1997. Midway through 1995, it was agreed to forgo the 1997 start date in favor of 1999
beginning to a single currency area. Since there was no specific number of States
outlined in the Treaty for a 1999 start date, a general consensus of “two large countries
and [a] few small countries” became the new litmus test for the launch of monetary union
(Apel 125).
The convergence criteria for the 1999 launch of monetary union were as follows
(Apel 127):
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1. A high degree of price stability, which was defined as an average rate of
inflation that did not exceed by more than one and a half percent that of, at
most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability.
The time period for observance of this criterion would be the year before
the examination.
2. The convergence of interest rates—defined as a nominal long-term interest
rate observed one year in advance to the examination—^that does not
exceed the average nominal long-term interest rate of the three best
performing Member States by more than two percent. These long-term
interest rate differentials would reflect the sustainability of achieving
convergence of monetary policies and public finance ratios.
3. The sustainability of the government financial position which is assessed
through the regular surveillance procedure of public finance ratios that did
not result in an unfavorable Ecofin Council decision.
4. Participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism that would reflect the
willingness of the Member State in respecting the normal fluctuation
margins without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the
examination and that would show whether or not the Member State had
devalued its currency’s bilateral central rate against any other Member
State’s currency on its own initiative for this same two-year period.

Other considerations that would weigh on the minds of those responsible for
electing those member states who could join the monetary union based on a convergence
determination w ere t he i ntegration r esults o f the goods, services and c apital and 1 abor
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markets. Upon recommendation by the European Commission and on the basis of these
convergence reports, the member states fulfilling the necessary conditions for the
adoption of a single currency would be submitted for approval to all member states via
each country’s representation on the Ecofm Council. A majority vote of all the member
states was needed for a country be designated as “in compliance with convergence
criteria.

This designation would be issued in a recommendation that the Ecofin Council

would submit to the “Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State,” who
must confirm which Member States met the necessary conditions for the adoption of a
single currency(Apel 128).
Three of the countries that were found to be “in compliance with the convergence
criteria” decided to “opt-out” of joining the European Monetary Union in its first stage
(Ciminero 12). These three countries were the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden.
On January 1, 1999, the European Monetary Union began. As one senior economist
noted—the “EMU i s n ot a revolution b ut an evolution”(Ciminero 12). N ow that the
monetary union is currently operating, the most glaringly obvious question facing the
current members is whether or not any other countries will join. While the potential
membership of many countries to the EMU would be interesting to study, the focus of
this paper is narrowed to the United Kingdom and the question: would it be economically
wise for the United Kingdom to join the European Monetary Union?
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IV
Regression and Correlation Data Analysis

In examining the United Kingdom’s decision to become a member of the
European Monetary Union, I will analyze three key economic indicators—inflation,
unemployment, and real GDP growth—spanning from 1970 to 1999 with respect to
current members of the EMU to determine the degree of economic integration of the
United Kingdom with the other EMU nations. I use three EMU nations for the data
computation: France, Germany, and Italy. For the sake of comparison, the same tests
were run with the same indicators from the United States to determine the extent of
integration between it and France, Germany, and Italy. My conclusion as to whether or
not United Kingdom inclusion is a relevant factor in achieving successful economic and
monetary union throughout Europe will be based not only on the extent of integration the
United Kingdom is shown to exhibit with Germany, France, and Italy, but it will also take
into account the extent to which the United States is economically integrated with
Germany, F ranee, and Italy. If t he d egrees o f i ntegration w ith G ermany, France, and
Italy are similar for both the United States and the United Kingdom, then the decision is
less clear as to whether or not the United Kingdom should join the European Monetary
Union.
The goal of joining a monetary union—as stated previously—is maximizing
monetary efficiency gains, and, to do this, a high degree of economic integration between
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the potential entrant country and those currently making up the monetary union must first
exist.

To determine if this high degree of integration

exists between the United

Kingdom’s economy and economies of Germany, France, and Italy concerning inflation,
unemployment, and real GDP growth, 1 will estimate the following regression equations
for:

1.

Inflation:

rii's=A)+

+ftrii+^

riiiK=A)+fhUc,+ftriF+A^rii+^
2.

Unemployment:
URus = fi(i + /f|URo + /ijURp +

+s

URuk = /lo + PiVRc,+ftURp + ySjURi + e
3.

Real GDP Growth:
GDPus =Po+ /?iGDPg + y^zGDPp +ftGDPi + £
GDPuk = /? 0 +

1 GDPg +P 2GDPf +P 3GDP1 + £

I will also perform correlation tests to determine the extent of the correlation of
movement between the United Kingdom’s economy and the economies of France,
Germany, and Italy. It is important to note that if a high degree of integration is found—
represented in regression results by a large R square and in correlation results by a large
correlation coefficient—a case can be made for the United Kingdom to join the union. If,
however, the level of integration either does not appear high enough (not a high R square
value) or does not differ significantly enough from the R square values of the same tests
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performed with respect to the United States, then the decision to join the monetary union
is much less clear for the United Kingdom.
Resression Test Results. Stumhird Error, the T-statistic, and the P-valiie
The results of the regression tests performed on the inflation, unemployment, and
real GDP growth data, for both the United States and the United Kingdom, are
summarized in Table 4.1 below and are depicted as weak or strong relative to the other
statistic—FGI represents France, Germany, and Italy.
Table 4.1 - Regression Analysis Results
Regression Analysis Results: Strong or Weak(R square)
U.S. to FGI
U.K. to FGI
Inflation
Strong (0.742) Strong (0.695)
Strong (0.610) Strong (0.788)
Unemployment Rate
% of Real GDP Growth
Weak (0.042) Strong (0.469)
The Usefulness ofRegression Tests and Interpretation ofthe Results
The importance of the regression analysis is in its prediction of inflation,
unemployment, and GDP growth for both the United States and the United Kingdom by
the levels of inflation, unemployment, and GDP growth of France, Germany, and Italy.
The R square measure represents a percentage, and if this percentage is high (close to
one), then the respective indicator of the United States (or the United Kingdom)is said to
be highly associated with the same indicators of France, Germany, and Italy. This high
reliability of the prediction of one country’s inflation, unemployment, or GDP growth can
be interpreted as the result of closely integrated economies that “move” with each other.
Thus, the higher the R square between countries, the higher the likelihood is that the
economies of these countries are integrated. Conversely, an R-square measure that is not
high (not close to one) indicates that the economies of the countries are not closely
integrated. In this case, the lower the R-square measure, the lower the likelihood is that
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accurate predictions can be made about the United States (or the United Kingdom) by
examining the same indicators of France, Germany, and Italy. In this latter result the
economies are not related to and do not “move” with one another.
If the R-square measure is high, the other related results of the tests need to be
examined so as to provide a frame of reference for understanding how significant the test
results are. The regression results will also provide for each variable a coefficient, a
standard error measurement, a T-statistic, and a P-value. The standard error associated
with each calculation is important because it is the measurement of“how far off’ the true
number for inflation, unemployment, and GDP growth are from the predicted values
found using the data from France, Germany, and Italy. Any T-statistic that is equal to or
greater than two is said to be significant, and any T-statistic less than two is considered
insignificant. The importance of the T-statistic is in its ability to reveal any relationship
that may exist between the countries measured. For example, the results ofthe regression
tests (the R square values) can be plotted on an X-Y axis, and a line can be drawn
through the data points. If the line is horizontal—as opposed to a negatively or positively
sloping line—the slope equals zero and no relationsliip is said to exist amongst the data
points. However, if the slope does not equal zero, then there does exist a relationship
among the data—either a negative or positive relationship. If a T-statistic is insignificant
(less than two) then the there is no assurance that the slope of the line (determined by the
coefficient of each variable country)—if one was drawn through the data points—^would
not be zero. Thus, an insignificant T-statistic will not allow for the rejection of the
hypothesis that the slope of the line is zero. If, however, the T-statistic is significant, the
hypothesis that the slope of this line is zero can be rejected and a relationship among the
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data points most probably exists.

The P-value can be loosely interpreted as the

probability that the estimated coefficient equals zero.
Inflation Re2ression Results
The results that were found from regression tests concerning inflation of the
United States and the United Kingdom with respect to France, Germany, and Italy are
summarized in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2 - Inflation Regression Results
US-FGI R square = 0.742
UK-FGIR square = 0.695

Germany
France
Italy

Coefficient
0.112
0.476
0.085

Standard
Error
0.223
0.288
0.188

TStat
0.501
1.654
0.454

Pvalue
0.621
0.110
0.654

CoefTicient
0.568
-0.115
0.736

Standard
Error
0.441
0.569
0.371

PtStat value
1.288 0.209
-0.201 0.842
1.984 0.058

Inflation Resression Results Analyzed
The calculated R squared (0.742) of United States inflation with respect to France,
Germany, and Italy (FGI) indicates a high likelihood that the United States’ inflation
level can be accurately predicted by the inflation levels of France, Germany, and Italy.
The calculated R square (0.695) of United Kingdom’s inflation level with respect to
France, Germany, and Italy (FGI) also indicates a high likelihood that the inflation levels
of France, Germany, and Italy can predict the inflation level of the United Kingdom. In
other words, according to the calculated R square with respect to inflation, the economies
of the United States, France, Germany, and Italy—as well as the economies of the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy—exhibit a high degree ofintegration.
Further examination of the coefficient, the standard error, the T-statistic, and the
P-value offer a clearer picture of the relationship of the economies in each test. Since the
U.S.-Germany T-statistic for inflation is 0.501, it is not significant and can therefore
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provide no evidence for ihc rejection of the hypothesis that the coefficient is not actually
zero. If this hypothesis cannot be rejected and the coefficient is likely zero, then no
relationship can be present. Moreover, the U.S.-Germany P-value is 0.621 indicating a
probability of sixty-two percent that the coefficient (and thus the slope ofthe line) is zero.
As a result, further evidence is given to establish that there is no clearly indicated positive
relationship—as shown in the positive coefficient—between the inflation levels of the
United States and Germany. The U.S.-France T-statistic for inflation is 1.654. Although
no clear positive relationship is evident between the inflation levels of the United States
and France because of the insignificant T-statistic, it is important to note that—according
to the related P-value—the probability that the respective coefficient is zero is eleven
percent. The U.S.-Italy T-statistic for inflation is 0.454. No clear relationship between
the inflation levels of Italy and the United States exists due to the insignificant T-statistic,
and related P-value of 0.654 indicates a high probability that the coefficient is, in fact,
zero dispelling the initial appearance of a positive relationship as expressed in the
coefficient.
The U.K.-Germany T-statistic for inflation is insignificant at 1.288. A twenty-one
percent probability exists that the coefficient is zero, and, thus, it appears that no positive
relationship—shown in the positive coefficient—exists between the levels of inflation for
the United Kingdom and Germany. The U.K.-France T-statistic for inflation is -0.201
and its associated P-value is 0.842—both of which indicate a high likelihood that the
coefficient is actually zero and the negative relationship shown in the coefficient is not
apparent. The U.K.-Italy T-statistic is 1.984 and is not quite significant. Although the Tstatistic is not significant, the P-value reveals less than six percent probability that the
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coefficient is zero, and a conclusion could be drawn the positive relationship shown in
the coefficient—however slight—may be present between the levels of inflation between
the United Kingdom and Italy, especially when the standard error of0.371 is present.
US-FGI and UK-FGI Unemployment Resressioti
The results found from regression tests concerning unemployment of the United
States and the United Kingdom with respect to France, Germany, and Italy are
summarized in Table 4.3 below.
Table 4.3 - Unemployment Regression Results
US-FGI Unemployment
R square = 0.610
Standard
Coefficient
Error
TStat
0.422
0.226
1.866
Germany
0.581
0.236
2.462
France
-1.498
0.243
-6.160
Italy

Pvalue
0.073
0.021
0.000

UK-FGI Unemployment
R square - 0.788
Standard
Coefficient Error
tStat
-0.607
0.403
-1.508
1.665
0.420
3.964
-0.526
0.433
-1.215

Pvalue
0.144
0.001
0.235

Unemployment Regression Results Analyzed
The calculated R square (0.610) for the United States’ unemployment level with
respect to France, Germany, and Italy reveals a strong relationship in the economies;
however, an even stronger relationship in the economies of the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and Italy are present in the calculated U.K.-FGI R square of 0.788. It appears
by examining the results of both of these regression tests, that the economies of both the
United States and the United Kingdom exhibit a high degree of integration with the
economies of France, Germany, and Italy with respect to Unemployment. Further
examination oft hese t est r esults w ill b e u ndertaken s imilarly t o t he p revious Inflation
regression results of the associated coefficient, standard error, T-statistic, and P-value for
each respective country.
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Upon examination of the U.S.-Germany T-statistic for unemployment, it is found
to be insignificant at 1.866, but the P-value is found to be 0.073. Because there is a seven
percent probability that the associated coefficient is zero and the standard error of the R
square is 0.226, it is likely—although extremely improbable—that there could be a
positive relationship—shown by the positive coefficient—between the unemployment
level of the United States with that of Gemiany. However, because of the insignificance
of the T-statistic, no relationship is said to exist.

The U.S.-France T-statistic for

unemployment is 2.462. This significant T-statistic coupled with a standard error of
0.236 and a P-value of two percent clearly indicates a positive relationship—as shown in
the positive coefficient—between the unemployment level of the United States and that
of France. Lastly the U.S.-Italy unemployment T-statistic is significant at -6.160. The
associated standard error is 0.243 and a P-value of0.000 clearly indicates the presence of
a

negative

relationship—as

shown

in

the negative coefficient—^between the

unemployment level of the United States and the unemployment level of the United
Kingdom.
The U.K.-Germany T-statistic for unemployment of -1.508 is insignificant.
Further, the standard error associated with this T-statistic is 0.403—^not large enough for
there to be even the slightest possibility of the negative relationship between the
unemployment level of the United Kingdom and that of Germany as indicated by the
coefficient. Further, the probability that the coefficient is zero is given in the P-value at
0.144. The U.K.-France T-statistic for unemployment at 3.96 is obviously significant
with an immaterial standard error of0.42. Further, there exists a one-tenth of a percent of
probability that the positive coefficient is zero, signaling a positive relationship between
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the unemployment level of the United Kingdom and France. The U.K.-Italy T-statistic
for unemployment at -1.215 is insignificant and an immaterial 0.433 standard error and a
twenty-four percent probability that the negative coefficient is, indeed, zero. The initial
appearance of a negative relationship between the two countries’ unemployment levels is
actually non-existent.
Real GDP Growth Rate Regression Results
The results found from regression tests concerning unemployment of the United
States and the United Kingdom with respect to France, Germany, and Italy are
summarized in Table 4.4 below.
Table 4.4- Real GDP Regression Results
US-FGl Real GDP Growth
UK-FGI Real GDP Growth
R square = 0.469
R square - 0.042
PStandard
Standard
tStat
Coefficient Error
value
Coefficient Error
tStat
0.073
0.167
0.441
0.663
-0.159
0.138
-1.153
Germany
France
0.374
0.408
0.918
0.367
0.618
0.338
1.825
-0.239
0.273
-0.875
0.390
0.114
0.227
0.504
Italy

Pvalue
0.259
0.080
0.618

Real GDP Growth Rate Results Analyzed
The last regression I performed concerned the growth rate of real GDP. The
calculated R square (0.042) found between the United States’ real GDP growth and that
of France, Germany, and I taly r eveals that no apparent relationship exists between the
two data sets. This result is somewhat surprising given the indication of a relationship
between the unemployment regression results because unemployment and real GDP
growth are often inversely related. The calculated R square (0.470) between the United
Kingdom’s real GDP growth rate and the real GDP growth rate of Germany, France, and
Italy is somewhat strong, but—perhaps more importantly—it is much stronger than the
United States’ calculated R square. This result is more in-line with the results on the
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regression of ihc

United

Kingdom’s unemployment level with respect to the

unemployment levels of Gemiany, France, and Italy.
The U.S.-Gemiany T-statistic for real GDP growth is insignificant at 0.441, and a
probability of sixty-six percent exists that the positive relationship shown by the
coefficient is non-existent.

The U.S.-France T-statistic for real GDP growth is also

insignificant at 0.918 and the P-value provides a thirty seven percent probability that the
real GDP growth rate of the United States and France are not related. The U.S.-Italy Tstatistic for real GDP growth is -0.875. This insignificant T-statistic and the related Pvalue of 0.39 convey that the apparent negative relationship between the two countries as
shown in the coefficient is clearly non-existent.
The U.K.-Gemiany T-statistic for real GDP growth is insignificant at -1.153 and
has an immaterial standard error. Also, there is a twenty-six percent probability that the
coefficient is zero—a clear indication that the negative relationship between the two
countries’ real GDP growth levels does not exist. The U.K.-France T-statistic for real
GDP growth is close to being significant at 1.825—especially when taking into
consideration its associated standard error of 0.338.

The P-value predicting the

probability of the coefficient being zero is 0.08, which is a small likelihood the positive
relationship expressed in the coefficient actually does not exist between the two
countries’ real GDP growth levels.

However, because the T-statistic produced is, in

itself, insignificant, no relationship is said to exist—especially because it could only exist
in a rare case whereby the measure was inaccurate by the entire value of the standard
error. The insignificant T-statistic of the U.K.-Italy result is 0.504. Also, the P-value
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shows that there is a sixty-two percent probability that the positive relationship expressed
in the coefficient is non-existent concerning the hvo countries* real GDP growth levels.
A Special Case for Regression Ancilvsis
A special case sometimes arrives when the explanatory variables (in this case
Germany, France, and Italy) have a cumulative effect on the left hand variable (in this
case the United States and the United Kingdom) but the math of the regression
calculation cannot pick out the individual effects of the explanatory variables themselves.
The sign that this effect—called multi-collinearity—is hindering the correct picture being
drawn from the regression results is when the R square value is large—representing a
large degree of integration—but the T-statistics for each explanatory variable are
insignificant and the P-values for each variable are large. In other words, the results of
the tests give a “false positive” that there is no relationship between the variables.
In this case the R square values for the U.K.-GFI for inflation, unemployment,
and real GDP growth are high indicating integrated economies of the countries. It is the
T-statistics and the P-values that cast doubt on the extent of this integration. The U.S.GFI R square values for inflation and unemployment also indicate a degree of integration
of economies of the countries. Again, it is the T-statistics and the P-values that discredit
the indication of a relationship between the United States’ economy and the economies of
France, Germany, and Italy.
To measure this cumulative effect I performed regression tests using the average
inflation, unemployment, and real GDP growth of Germany, France, and Italy by
estimating the following equations for:

42

1.

Inflation:

rii’s -

+ /^iFlAvgCin + £

1 li K — /^o + /AriAvgCil l + £
2.

Unemployment:
URus - Ih + ^lURAvgCii'i + ^

URi iK 3.

+ /^lURAvgCiFl + £

Real GDP Growth:

GDPus -^0 + /^iGDPAvgCFi + £

GDPuk -

P iGDPAvgGFi + e

Resression Results vis-a-vis GFI Average
The results of the regression tests performed on the inflation, unemployment, and
real GDP growth data for both the United States and the United Kingdom vis-a-vis the
GFI Average are summarized in Table 4.5 below and are depicted as weak or strong
GFI represents France, Germany, and Italy.
Table 4.5 - Inflation, Unemployment,GDP Growth Regression Results
Regression Analysis Results: Strong or Weak(R square)
U.S. to Avg FGI U.K. to Avg FGl
Inflation
Strong 0.734
Strong 0.685
Weak
0.018
Strong 0.75
Unemployment Rate
% of Real GDP Growth
Weak 0.005
Strong 0.303
Inflation Resression Results vis-a-vis GFIAverase
The results found from regression tests concerning inflation of the United States
and the United Kingdom with respect to the average inflation of France, Germany and
Italy are summarized in Table 4.6 below.
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Table 4.6 - Inflation Regression Results vis-a-vis GFI Average
U.S.-Avg GFI Inflation
U.K.-Avg GFI Inflation
R square = 0 734
R square = 0.685
PStandard
Standard
Coefficient Error
tStat value
Coefficient Error
tStat

Pvalue

FGI
Avg

0.691

0.079

8.797

0.000

1.216

0.156

7.807 0.000

Avera£e Inflation Regression Results Analyzed
The U.S.-Avg GFI T-statislic for Inflation is significant at 8.797 with an
immaterial standard error.

The probability that the coefficient is zero signaling no

relationship between the United States’ Inflation and the Average of Germany, France,
and Italy’s inflation is zero. The U.K.-Avg GFI T-statistic for Inflation is significant at
7.807 and i t, too, has an immaterial standard error of0.156. T he probability that the
coefficient is zero is, also, zero.

Thus, it can be reasonably inferred that there is a

relationship between the average of France, Germany, and Italy’s Inflation and that of
both the United States and the United Kingdom.
Unemployment Resression Results vis-a-vis GFI Avera2e
The results found from regression tests concerning unemployment of the United
States and the United Kingdom with respect to the average unemployment of France,
Germany, and Italy are summarized in Table 4.7 below.
Table 4.7 - Unemployment Regression Results vis-a-vis GFI Average
U.S.-FGI Unemployment
R square = 0.018

FGI Avg

Coeffici
ent
-0.065

Standard
Error
0.092

tStat
-0.708

UK-FGI Unemployment
R square = 0.75
Pvalue
0.485
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Standard
Coefficient Error
0.995
0.122

tStat P-value
8.179 0.000

Avera2e Unemplovnicnt Results Analyzed
Only the U.K.-A\ g FGI T-statistic is significant with a value of 8.179 whereas the
U.S.-Avg FGI T-slaiistic is insignificant at -0.078. The respective P-values are 0.000 and
0.485

meaning t hat t here i s n o p robable c hance o f t he c oefficient being zero for the

U.K.-Avg FGI measure and there is a forty-nine percent probability of the coefficient of
the U.S.-Avg FGI measure being zero. It can thus be stated that there is a relationship
between the United Kingdom's unemployment level and the average level of Germany,
France, and Italy. It can also be stated that there is no relationship between the average
level of unemployment of Gennany, France, and Italy and the unemployment level of the
United States.
Real GDP Growth Regression Results vis-a-vis GFl Average
The results found from regression tests concerning real GDP growth of the United
States and the United Kingdom with respect to the average real GDP growth of France,
Germany, and Italy are summarized in Table 4.8 below.
Table 4.8 - Real GDP Growth Regression Results vis-^-vis GFI Average
US-GFI Real GDP Growth Rate
UK-GFI Real GDP Growth Rate
R square = 0.303
R square = 0.005
PPStandard
Standard T
value
Coefficient Error
tStat
Coefficient Error
Stat
value
0.178
0.377
0.709
0.166
0.580
3.485 0.002
FGI Avg 0.067

Averase Real GDP Growth Regression Results Analyzed
The T-statistic for U.S.-GFI real GDP growth rate is insignificant at 0.377,
whereas the T-statistic for the U.K.-real GDP growth rate is significant at 3.485. The
respective standard errors are immaterial. Also, the respective P-values indicate that the
real GDP growth rate of the United States is not accurately predicted by the average
growth rates in Germany, France, and Italy, whereas the P-value for GDP growth rate of
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the United Kingdom is accurately predicted by that of Germany, France, and Italy
because there is only two-tenths of a percentage probability of the coefficient being zero.
Correlation Tests
In addition to regression tests, correlation tests were performed on the same data
to determine if, even in the presence of regression suggested evidence, there did exist
correlation between either the United States’ economy or the United Kingdom’s
economy—or both— with the economies of France, Gemiany, and Italy.
Inflation Correlation Results
The correlation results were found with respect to the inflation levels among all of
the economies are summarized in Table 4.9 below.

UK
Germany
France
Italy
US

Table 4.9 - Inflation Correlation Results
Inflation Correlation
US
UK
Italy
Germany France
1
1
0.634
1
0.710
0.800
1
0.635
0.959
0.821
1
0.639
0.859
0.833
0.821

Inflation Correlation Analyzed
According to the results of this data table, the inflation levels of the United States
throughout t he 1 ast t hirty years a re 1 ess t ightly correlated w ith G ermany than they are
with France and Italy. In fact, it appears that the correlation between the United States
and Germany exhibit the same relationship that the United Kingdom and Germany
exhibit, but the United States shares with France and Italy a tighter correlation than does
the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom’s inflation levels over the last thirty years are tightly
correlated with the inflation levels of the United States, Italy, France, and are
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correlated—but n ot t ightly—with t he i nflation 1 evels o f Germany;the highest level of
correlation is with the United States and the lowest level of correlation is with Germany.
In addition to the correlation with the United Kingdom and the United States, the tightest
correlation among France, Germany, and Italy alone is France and Italy with a correlation
over 0.959, and the loosest correlation among the three European countries is Italy and
Germany with a correlation of less than 0.635.
Unemployment Correlation Results
The correlation results found with respect to unemployment among the countries
throughout the thirty year time span of 1970 to 1999 are summarized in Table 4.10
below.
Table 4.10 - Unemployment Correlation Results

U.K.
Germany
France
Italy
U.S.

U.K.
1
0.801
0.869
0.792
-0.061

Unemployment Correlation
Germany France
1
0.965
0.924
-0.037

1
0.953
-0.088

Italy

U.S.

1
-0.309

1

Unemployment Correlation Results Analyzed
No correlation exists between the levels of unemployment throughout the thirty
year time period between United States and France, Germany, and Italy. There was also
no correlation found between the unemployment levels of United States and the United
Kingdom throughout the thirty years time period either.
The unemployment levels of the United Kingdom throughout the thirty year time
period are tightly correlated with France, Germany, and Italy—^being correlated to France
the tightest. It is interesting to note, however, that not only are France, Germany, and
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Italy tightly correlated to each other, but also that all of the correlations among them are
over 0.924.
Real GDP Correlation Results
The correlation results found with respect to real GDP growth among all five of
the countries throughout the thirty year time span of 1970 to 1999 are summarized in
Table 4.11 below.
Table 4.11- Real GDP Growth Correlation Results

U.S.
U.K.
Germany
France
Italy

Real GDP Growth Rate Correlation
U.K.
U.S.
Germany France
1
0.430234 1
0.099032 0.073379 1
0.089774 0.662311 0.338184 1
0.006573 0.61811
0.33148
0.891861

Italy

1

Real GDP Correlation Results Analyzed
The United States’ GDP growth rates are very loosely correlated with those of
France, Germany, and Italy—almost to the point of not being correlated at all. The
United Kingdom’s GDP growth rates, on the other hand, are correlated with France and
Italy—though not tightly—and barely correlated to Germany, even less so than the
United States.
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C'onclusion

The road to monetary union in Europe has been a long and somewhat arduous
journey spanning over fifty years, sur\ iving numerous leadership regimes of numerous
European nations, and has faced down many opponents along the way. Many theories
and many treaties and many “communities" have come and gone tliroughout the years but
one goal has remained foremost in every proponent leader, in every signed treaty, and as
the foundation of every “community" boni in Europe: maximizing monetary efficiency
gains throughout Europe. While this goal was bom more than half a century ago, it has
only recently begun to become feasible—due almost entirely to the stipulations and
regulations set forth in the Maastricht Treaty. Because of the large role that the summit
in Maastricht—and the resulting treaty—had on setting a timetable for economic
integration among European nations, the recent history of the trek to achieve monetary
union in Europe has become known, unofficially, as the “road to Maastricht.”
Currently there are eleven countries that are official participating members of the
European Monetary Union—the official name for this single currency area—^with several
other nations vacillating between joining and remaining neutral. Of those countries, the
United Kingdom is, perhaps, the most important. Because of United Kingdom’s storied
history with monetary union attempts—including pulling out of the “Snake” before the
collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system and then-Prime Minister
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Margaret Thatcher's \ chcnicnl anti-European stance

the United Kingdom, and its

upcoming vote to decide \\ liether or not it \N'ill become a member of the EMU in 2003, is
the latest factor some will watch to “predict" the fate of this most recent and most
successful attempt to uni tv Europe monetarily. The question then becomes, does the
United Kingdom hold the key to the ultimate success or failure of the Union?
Goal
The goal of this paper was to answer that question—partly

by eliminating

current and historical politics from the discussion and focus on the underlying economics
of the union and then limit the economic scope to include just three major indicators of
economic integration: inflation, unemployment, and real GDP growtli rate. The three
“explanatory" variables used were the economies, as explained by the above three
indicators, of Germany, France, and Italy. The purpose of using these three European
nations was to provide a basic sketch of the overall functioning of the EMU. By
computing regression and correlation analysis of the United Kingdom and the United
States with respect to Germany, France, and Italy, the extent of economic integration can
be d etermined b etween t he t ested e conomies. The g oal o f t he c omparison w as t o s ee
which, if either, of the countries—the United Kingdom or the United States—exhibited a
high degree of economic integration with the three EMU countries.
Results ofEstimated Regression Equations
The results of my estimated formulas were as follows for:
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1. Inflation;
1 Irs = 1.172 + 0.112r. + 0.476f + 0.085i
(0.223) (0.288) (0.118)

1 luK = -0.08 + 0.568g - 0.115,: + 0.736,
(0.441) (0.569) (0.371)
2. Unemployment:
UR us = 12.226 + 0.422c,+0.581f- 1.498,
(0.226) (0.236) (0.243)
URi,K = 1.207 - 0.607Pc + 1 -665Bf - 0.526B,
(0.403) (0.420) (0.433)
3. Real GDP Growth Rate;
GDPus = 0.026 + 0.073g + 0.374f - 0.239I
(0.167) (0.408) (0.273)
GDPuk = 0.008 - 0.1 59g + 0.61 8f + 0.114,
(0.138) (0.338) (0.227)
None of the T-statistics found in the regression tests with respect to the individual
explanatory variable countries were significant. This result would not allow for the
rejection of the hypothesis that the economic indicators observed in the United Kingdom
and the United States were predictable by merely observing those same indicators of
Germany, France, and Italy.

No relationship between the economies of Germany,

France, and Italy is indicated to exist with that of the United Kingdom or the United
States.
After this result, I performed additional regression tests to eliminate or take into
account the multi-collinearity effect sometimes found in the R square values.

In

performing this test, I calculated and average of the indicators of Germany, France, and
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Italy and entered them into the formula as one number. The results of my estimated
equations were as follows for:
1. Inflation:
Ill’s - 0.919 + 0.69lAvgCiFi
(0.079)

rii'K - 0.373 + 1.216,\vgGFi
(0.156)
2. Unemployment:
URus — 6.880 - 0.065AvgGFi65
(0.092)
fJRuK —0.313 - 0.995AvgGFi
(0.122)
3. Real GDP Growth Rate:
GDPus“0.029 + 0.067AvgGFi
(0.178)
GDPuk = 0.008 + 0.580AvgGFi
(0.166)
Results of Correlation Analyses
The correlation results indicate a strong relationship between the inflation level of
the U nited K ingdom and the i nflation 1 evels o f each o fthe other countries: Germany,
France, Italy, and the United States.

A strong correlation is also indicated to exist

between the United Kingdom’s unemployment level and the unemployment levels in
Germany, France, and I taly. The correlation results also indicate a strong relationship
between t he r eal G DP growth 1 evel o f t he U nited K ingdom w ith t he growth 1 evels of
France and Italy. The United Kingdom’s and the United States’ real GDP growth level is
somewhat correlated. However, no correlation exists between the United Kingdom and
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the United States with respect to unemployment, and only a slight correlation between the
United Kingdom and Germany with respect to real GDP growth.
The c orrelation r esults i ndicate a strong relationship between the United States
inflation level and the inflation levels of each of the other countries: Germany, France,
Italy, and the United Kingdom. No correlation exists between the unemployment level of
the United States and those of Gennany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Further,
the U nited S tates r eal G DP g rowth i s c orrelated w ith the United Kingdom while only
being slightly correlated with Germany, France, and Italy.
Conclusion
As stated in Chapter Two of this paper, the monetary efficiency gains and
economic stability losses a country joining a monetary union would experience depends
on the level of integration (or lack of integration) between that country’s economy and
the economies of the countries it is joining.

In this paper, I tried to simulate the

combined economy of the European Monetary Union by analyzing the economic activity
of Germany, France, and Italy. In so doing, I used the three economic indicators of
Inflation, Unemployment, and real GDP growth. I then combined this data with the same
economic data for the United Kingdom and the United States—separately—for the
regression tests and comprehensively for the correlation analysis.
After performing the first of round of regression tests, I was not satisfied that the
results of the T-statistic and P-value measures were accurately portraying the relationship
(or lack thereof) of Germany, France, and Italy with the United Kingdom and the United
States. Given that the calculated R square values—^which were somewhat high for all
three measures related to the United Kingdom—did not seem to “match” the fact that
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eight of the nine T-statistics calculated for the United Kingdom were insignificant and
that a majority of the calculated P-values for the United Kingdom were somewhat large
as well, I was afraid that a condition of multi-collinearity existed. This condition appears
when the right hand variables (in this case Gemiany, France, and Italy) have a cumulative
effect on the left hand variables (in this case the United Kingdom and the United States),
but the “math" of the regression cannot “individualize" the effects of each country. To
rectify this situation, I re-performed the regression tests using—in the place of the
individual inputs from Germany, France, and Italy for each variable—an average input
for each year’s economic indicator. By using this “average” approach instead of the
“individual” approach, a small amount of change was observed in the R square values.
More importantly, the T-statistics and P-values observed in the second round of
regression tests appeared to agree with the “picture” that the R square values “painted”
about the relationship between the countries’ economies to a greater degree than did the
results of the T-statistics and P-values in the first round of regression tests. I was
therefore satisfied that what was happening in the first regression tests was due,
primarily, to the inability of the “math” of the regression to individualize the explanatory
value of the economic indicators of Germany, France, and Italy on those of the United
Kingdom and the United States.
Therefore, based on my analysis of the second set of regression tests
performed—the United Kingdom is in a better position than the United States to benefit
from monetary efficiency gains if it decided to join the European Monetary Union
because of the extent of integration its economy exhibits with the economies of Germany,
France, and Italy.

Although there are aspects of the tests that offer an indication of
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economic integration between the United States economy with the economies of
Germany, France, and Italy with respect to inflation, the overall results of the tests
indicated that the United Kingdom’s extent of integration with the economies of
Germany, France, and Italy is somewhat higher and more thorough than that of the
United States with respect to all three indicators. To enhance the validity to the results of
the second round of regression tests, the correlation tests also indicate a higher and more
thorough level of economic coordination of Germany, France, and Italy with the United
Kingdom than with the United States.
In view of these results, it is important to remember that the decision to join a
monetary union depends on the joining country’s position on the graphs presented in
Chapter Two of this paper, which measures the potential monetary efficiency gains and
economic stability losses a potential entrant country faces. All of the relevant factors that
determine t hat p osition have n ot b een analyzed in this p aper. H owever, based on the
results of my tests that measured the extent of integration between the economy of the
United Kingdom and the combined economies of Germany, France, and Italy (and the
lack of measured integration between the economy of the United States and the
economies o f G ermany, F ranee, and Italy), it appears that the United Kingdom would
benefit from entrance into the European Monetary Union. If the United Kingdom does
choose to join the EMU, it would, indeed, be a relevant factor of success for the
European Monetary Union in the Twenty-first century.
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^ These figures were created from the data used in the regression and correlation analysis of this paper
"Hie
data for the United Kingdom, Germany,France, and Italy can be found at Manfred Gartner’s
Macroeconomic Time Series website at www.fgn.unisg.ch/eumacrodata/dmtrxneu.htm and the data for
the
United States can be found in the Economic Report ofthe President at www.w3.access.gpo.gov/eop
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